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HOW THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES 
Michael Herz* 
INTRODUCTION 
The longstanding debate over the electoral college is now 
sufficiently mature that there may be nothing new to say.' When a 
subject has become overfamiliar, sometimes it is best approached 
from the side rather than head-on. In this Article I approach the 
electoral college debate from the side by considering its dominant 
metaphor, in the hope that doing so will "liberate rather than 
enslave thought."^ 
The pervasive metaphor invoked to justify not simply giving 
the White House to the candidate who receives the most votes is 
the World Series. To win the World Series, a team must win four 
games. The winner always and by definition prevails in a majority 
of the games played. However, the winner does not necessarily 
score the most total runs. If it loses blowouts and wins squeakers, 
a team will win the Series despite scoring far fewer total runs. 
The most striking example of a "gerrymandered" World 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This 
Article's title, as fans of baseball writing will recognize, is borrowed, mutatis mutandis, 
from a well-known paean to the sport of baseball. See THOMAS BOSWELL, HOW LIFE 
IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE GAME (1982). An alternative 
would have been "Why Time Begins on Election Day." Cf. THOMAS BOSWELL, WHY 
TIME BEGINS ON OPENING DAY (1984). Thanks to John McGinnis and Chuck Yablon for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 So one would infer, for example, from the recent publication of a new review of 
three books on the electoral college that were all published three decades ago. See Ann 
Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Dejd Vu, 95 Nw. L. REV. 993 (2001) (reviewing 
JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE 
OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1971); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND 
CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 
(1971); LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE REFORM (1972)). 
2 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in 
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often 
by enslaving it."). 
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Series took place in 1960, when the Pittsburgh Pirates prevailed, 
four games to three, over the mighty New York Yankees. The 
sweet and stunning victory came on Bill Mazeroski's solo home 
run in the bottom of the ninth inning of the seventh game, ranked 
by The Sporting News as the second greatest moment in the history 
of baseball.^ In their four victories, the Pirates outscored the 
Yankees by a total of seven runs, winning 6-4, 3-2, 5-2, and 10-9. 
In their three losses, the Pirates were outscored by 35 runs, losing 
16-3, 10-0, and 12-0. Overall, the Yankees outscored the Pirates 
55-27; as a team they hit .338 to the Pirates' .256; they had 10 home 
runs to the Pirates' 4; Yankees pitchers had a collective ERA of 
3.54, the Pirates' ERA was 7.11. In short, the Yankees dominated 
by every measure except the one that counted: total games won. 
This striking result even produced a moderately well-known Yogi-
ism: "We made too many wrong mistakes."" 
Although the gap was not as great, the Yankees/Pirates 
scenario was repeated four decades later—^not when the Yankees 
beat the Mets in the 2000 Series,^ but the following month when 
George Bush beat A1 Gore in the 2000 presidential election. Bush 
received 50,456,062 votes (47.89 percent). Gore 50,996,582 (48.4 
percent). Despite having half a million fewer runs than his 
opponent. Bush won the election because he won more games.® 
Defenders of the electoral college regularly invoke the World 
Series in general, and the 1960 World Series in particular.' In part. 
3 See RON SMITH, THE SPORTING NEWS SELECTS BASEBALL'S 25 GREATEST 
MOMENTS 20 (1999). Number one is Bobby Thompson's shot heard 'round the world. 
But see Murray Qiass, Just How Loud Was 'The Shot', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at D12 
(placing Mazeroski's home run first and Thompson's second on a list of the ten "most 
meaningful" home runs in history); see also Tim Cowlishaw, Mazeroski Gets Due, but Will 
His Feat?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8,2001, at IB (arguing that Mazeroski's home 
nm was more dramatic and significant than Thompson's). 
" YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: "I DIDN'T REALLY SAY EVERYTHING I SAID" 34 
(1998); see also id. (noting that "there was no other way to explain how we ever lost that 
series"). 
5 The Yankees took the 2000 Series 4 games to 1, a convincing, almost lopsided 
victory. In total runs, however, they only outscored the Mets 19-16. Thus, the 2000 Series 
is an example of the "magnifjdng effect" of tcdlying the results in distinct sub-components 
of a larger overall contest. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
® This tabulation ignores, of course, controversy over the methods of counting votes in 
Florida, Bush v. Gore, the butterfly ballot, allegations of voter fraud, and other claims that 
would lead to the conclusion that Gore won by any definition. For present purposes 
(indeed, for just about all purposes, really), it's the official version that counts; we will just 
stipulate that it is contested. 
' See, e.g., Proposals for Electoral College Reform- Hearings on H.J. Res. 28 and H.J. 
Res. 43 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 78 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 House Hearings] (questioning of Prof. Akhil 
Amar by Rep. Robert C. Scott) ("I would ask Professor Amar whether you were outraged 
when major league baseball awarded the New York Yankees last year's World Series, 
when they scored 18 runs in the series and the Atlanta Braves scored 26 nms in the 
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this reflects the irresistible allure of baseball metaphors, 
particularly in legal scholarship, where one might almost identify a 
"turn to baseball."^ But the World Series metaphor keeps popping 
up in discussions about the electoral college not just because it is 
neat and about sports; it is actually quite useful. Its usefulness is 
my topic. 
I. PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
TO CREATE PLAUSIBILITY 
Our modem intuitions about elections, formed in the post 
Reynolds v. Sims,^ one-person-one-vote era, are (1) to determine 
the winner we add up all the votes and see who has the most and 
(2) all votes count equally. The electoral college is notoriously 
inconsistent with these assumptions. First, the electoral college 
does not add up the popular votes. It adds up the electoral votes, 
and these are not necessarily the same. Almost every state 
allocates electoral votes on a winner-take-all system, so the margin 
of victory within each state is irrelevant to the overall outcome. 
As in 2000, the popular vote winner can be the electoral college 
loser. This looks weird. As Representative Ray LaHood (R. 111.), 
a long-time electoral college opponent, puts it: "In our democracy, 
if you mn for dogcatcher it's decided by popular vote.... The 
only exception is the highest elected office in the country."'" For 
LaHood, having the popular vote "overridden by the Electoral 
series?"); Jeff Greenfield, The Hidden Beauty of the System, TIME, NOV. 20, 2000, at 66; 
Andrea Neal, Electoral College Is More Bang for Buck, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, NOV. 23, 
2000, at F2. 
8 For examples of legal academics invoking baseball for analogies or insight, see EVA 
H. HANKS ET AL.. ELEMENTS OF LAW 324-25 (1994); Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the 
Rule of LMW, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239 (1998); Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses 
of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Richard Lempert, Error Behind the Plate and in the 
Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 407 (1986); Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to 
American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227 (1994); Robert M. Cover, Your Law-Baseball 
Quiz, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,1979, at A23. A valuable collection of such writing, along with 
articles and cases on substantive legal issues bearing on the game of baseball, is 
BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (Spencer Webber Waller et al. eds., 1995). 
There is even a small literature on the legitimacy of baseball analogies in legal writing. See 
Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in 
Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17 (1994); Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he 
Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Baseball, Metaphors, and "The Sex Stuff, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 813 (19%). 
' 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (adopting one-person, one-vote standard to require creation of 
legislative districts of equal size). 
'0 Albert R. Hunt, The Electoral College: Legitimate but Anachronistic, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 26,2000, at All (quoting Rep. Ray LaHood). 
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College" amounts to a "major calamity."" 
On the second point, votes would only be of equal weight it 
electoral college votes were exactly apportioned among the states, 
and then on the basis of those actually casting ballots rather than 
population. But in fact electoral votes are allocated by 
popu l a t i ons ,  wh ic h  a r e  n o t  pe r f ec t  mu l t i p l e s  o f  435 ;  t he  r a t e s  o f  
registration and of voting vary from one state to another, each 
state, regardless of size, gets two electoral votes (corresponding to 
its two Senators) in addition to the electoral votes allocated by 
population (corresponding to its Representatives). The result, as 
has often been pointed out, is a wide variation in the weight of 
individual votes and a particular dilution of individual voting 
strength in large states. So in 2000 Vermont had 97,931 1/3 voters 
per elector; New York had 206,727 1/4 voters per elector. In this 
sense, a Vermonter's vote counted twice as much as a New 
Yorker's.'' This also looks odd at best, if not, in the words of 
Senator Durbin, "undemocratic and unfair.'"' So the electoral 
" M; see also 112 CONG. REC. 5928 (Mar. 15, 1966) (statement of Sen. Quentin 
Burdick) (labeling the situation in which a President takes office after losing the popular 
vote "a tragedy"); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, 
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 37 (1967) (concluding that a "national referendum is the only 
" t r u l y  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e s s "  f o r  e l e c t i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ) .  • .  , .  
12 These figures are obtained by dividing each state's 2000 vote totals, as prodded by 
the National Archives and Records Administration, by its number of electors. 5ee Nat 1 
Archives & Records Admin., 2000 Presidential Election: Electoral Vote Results, at 
http://www.nara.gOv/fedreg/elctcoll/2000res.html (last visited July 16, 2001). The more 
usual calculation is not voters per elector but citizens per elector. Based on the 1990 
census Vermont had 187,586 citizens per elector. New York 545,165; a difference of about 
three to one. See id. (showing New York population of 17,990,455 and Vermont 
population of 562,758). The difference between the per-citizen and the per-voter numbers 
indieates a higher rate of voter registration and/or a higher rate of voting and/or a larger 
percentage of voting-eligible residents in Vermont than in New York. ^ j 
" 146 CONG. REC. 811,618-19 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (remarks of Sen. Richard 
Durbin) It is often asserted that, because individual votes in small states are weightier in 
this sense, the small states benefit from the electoral coUege; indeed, popular coverage of 
the 2000 election focused almost exclusively on this purported bias in favor of small st^es. 
See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Eramers, Federalism, and One 
Person One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2548 & n.l09 (2001) (reporting that of 169 
articles concerning the electoral college in the New York Times and the Washington Post 
appearing between September 1, 2000 and April 1, 2001, twenty-eight reported a small-
state bias, one a large-state bias, and one conflicting small-state and large-state biases). In 
fact, the small states' edge is rather theoretical. In every practical way, it is the larger 
statk that benefit—they get the attention beeause they have the votes, and, almost always, 
as go the large states, so goes the election. See, e.g.. The Electoral College arid Direct 
Election of the President: Hearing on S.J. Res. 297, S.J. Res. 302, and S.J. Res. 312 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, m2d Cong. 8 
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings] (prepared statement of Sen. David Pryor) 
(contending that "simple electoral math dictates that the candidates spend all their time 
campaigning in the eight to twelve largest states, because that is where the electoral prizes 
are" and that the system "not only encourages, but mandates, campaigns in only big 
states"). John Banzhaf was thought to have proved a large-state bias three decades ago. 
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college conflicts with prevailing assumptions about elections. As 
Senator Birch Bayh, another longtime opponent of the electoral 
college, succinctly put it at the beginning of a hearing on his 
proposal for direct election of the President: 
[U]nless someone does a superhuman job of persuading, I am 
going to remain convinced the direct election should replace 
our present system, because direct election is the only system 
that guarantees that every vote will count, that every vote will 
count the same, and that the candidate with the most votes will 
win.'" 
The World Series metaphor speaks powerfully to the first, and 
most salient, of these two aspects of the electoral college. (It has 
something more indirect and complicated to add to our 
understanding of the second, as I shall discuss below.). Electoral 
college skeptics who assume the popular vote should determine 
the winner have to stop and think when they first hear the World 
Series metaphor. The electoral college seems odd; the World 
Series seems sensible. But these two venerable institutions 
operate in similar ways. The analogy works because it draws on 
our learned intuitions about one thing, baseball, to make us think 
differently about another thing, the electoral college, which seems 
counter-intuitive. 
So, the first value of the metaphor is that it lends plausibility; 
it forces people to think more carefully; it lets them see that 
perhaps the electoral college could (not does—^that's asking rather 
a lot from a metaphor) make sense after all. 
The World Series analogy should diminish concern over the 
winner of the popular vote not becoming President in a second 
way as well. Everyone understands and accepts that when a game 
is set up according to certain rules, the players act strategically in 
light of those rules. A manager who is trying to win the most 
games will adopt different strategies than a manager trying to 
see John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral 
College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968), although his analysis has also been attacked, see, 
e.g., Howard Margolis, The Banzhaf Fallacy, AM. POL. SCI. REV., Feb. 1983, at 321. 
One reason the electoral college has survived the many efforts to abolish it may be 
that both small and large states think it benefits them, even though they cannot both be 
right. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 9-10; Estes Kefauver, The Electoral College: Old 
Reforms Take on a New Look, 27 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 188, 1% (1%2) (noting that 
"[tjhere were instances in our hearings where a witness would dismiss the practical 
chances of direct national election proposals as depriving the small states of their electoral 
vote advantage and then attack the present system as favoring the large states over the 
smaller ones"). 
Direct Popular Election of the President and Vice President of the United States: 
Hearings on S.J. Res. 28 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2-3 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Hearings] (opening statement 
of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
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score the most runs—a sacrifice bunt or a defensive replacement in 
the late innings of a close game makes sense if it is important to 
win games, but does not if all that matters is total runs. It is 
impossible to look at the results of a contest played under one set 
of rules and know what would have happened under a different set 
of rules, because the game would not have been played the same 
way-
Applied to the presidential elections, the point is that we do 
not know who would have won the most total votes if total votes 
were what the candidates were trying to maximize. Invoking the 
World Series (of course), John McGinnis makes this point: 
[T]he popular vote result has no electoral meaning because the 
candidates were not in a contest for the popular vote. If they 
had been seeking the highest popular vote, they would have 
campaigned entirely differently. George Bush would have 
campaigned more in Texas to run up his vote and A1 Gore 
would have campaigned more in California. Both would have 
campaigned more in urban areas because it is easier to turn out 
the vote there. They would have run their television 
advertisements in different places and perhaps even run 
different advertisements altogether. Given the less than four 
tenths of a percentage point difference between Bush and Gore, 
we cannot be certain who would have won the popular vote 
Accordingly, it is not entirely coherent to label those instances 
in which the college winner loses the popular vote as 
"misfirings" of the electoral college.^^ 
Speaking before the 2000 election, and anticipating a possible 
Gore victory in the electoral college and loss of the popular vote, 
Walter Delhnger made precisely the same argument in rejecting 
the claim that such an outcome would undermine the winner's 
legitimacy: "There's no real legitimacy argument. If the 
presidency was decided by the popular vote, the two candidates 
would have run different races. We simply don't know who would 
have won."^® 
This is inescapably true, at least for a relatively close election 
such as that of 2000 (or 1888 or 1876). This is not to say that the 
campaign incentives that the electoral college creates are the right 
John O. McGinnis, Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral College, 29 FLA. ST. L. 
REV. 995, 996 (2001). For further development of the point, with a reference to the 1960 
World Series, see Michael Albert, Election Issues: Money, Structure, Manipulation, and the 
Electoral College, ZNET DAILY COMMENTARIES (NOV. 13, 2000), at 
http://www.lbbs.org/ZSustainers/ZDaily/ 2000-ll/13albert.htm. 
16 Hunt, supra note 10, at A27 (quoting Walter Delhnger); see also Althouse, supra 
note 1, at 1012-13. The outcome in a particular state being a foregone conclusion will 
affect not only the candidate's strategy, but also voter turnout. Supporters and opponents 
alike may stay at home because they view their votes as purely symbolic. 
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ones. But the system creates certain incentives, and given those 
incentives we cannot know what the outcome would have been 
under a different set of rules; therefore the inconsistency between 
electoral and popular vote outcomes should bother us less than it 
otherwise would." The analogy to the World Series is useful 
because it helps make all this clear by invoking a setting where 
exactly the same dynamic operates and is understood and 
accepted. 
II. THE ACTUAL, THOUGH ALSO HELPFUL, 
INACCURACY OF THE ANALOGY 
In fact, the electoral college is not like the World Series, 
despite what everyone says. In the World Series, all games count 
equally. In the electoral college, state votes are weighted. A 
state's electoral vote total is a function of, though not perfectly 
proportionate to, its population. The smallest states have three 
electoral votes; the biggest, California, has fifty-five. The closer 
analogy to the World Series, then, is the process by which the 
House selects the President and the Senate the Vice-President if 
the electoral college fails to produce a majority: one state, one 
vote.'® That system is a far greater departure from the just-count-
the-votes principle than is the electoral college. 
Interestingly, the World Series/12th Amendment model is a 
far greater departure on paper than in practice. The winner of the 
electoral college has almost always also won a majority of the 
states. The two exceptions were 1976, when Ford took twenty-
seven states and Carter twenty-four, and 1960, when Nixon took 
twenty-five states, Kennedy twenty-two, and Byrd two, with 
Kennedy and Byrd splitting each of the remaining four." In other 
words, only twice has the difference between the World 
Series/12th Amendment approach and the electoral college 
approach actually made a difference in the outcome.^" 
" The point holds in the other direction, but more weakly. That is, because no 
candidate was trying to maximize total votes, we should not be reassured when the 
electoral college winner is also the popular vote winner. Perhaps if the dual loser had 
been trying to maximize popular votes, he could have done so, even though an electoral 
college victory was out of reach. 
'8 See U.S. CONST, amend. XII ("But in choosing the President, the votes shall be 
taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote "). 
" Of course, in the three elections in which the electoral college chose the popular 
vote loser—2000, 1888, 1876—it was the popular vote loser who won a majority of the 
states. So there have been five elections in which the popular vote winner would have lost 
in a true "World Series" system. 
2" The fact that the overall winner nearly always wins an actual majority of the states is 
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Although this difference has rarely been of consequence in 
presidential elections, it is significant nonetheless. The one-state-
one-vote rule has been roundly criticized. Consider James 
Madison: 
[W]ith all possible abatements the present rule of voting for 
President by the H. of Reps, is so great a departure from the 
Republican principle of numerical equality, and even from the 
federal rule which qualifies the numerical by a State equality, 
and is so pregnant also with a mischievous tendency in practice, 
that an amendment of the Constitution on this point is justly 
called for by all its considerate & best friends.^' 
With Sanford Levinson leading the attack, modem writers 
have also been fiercely critical.^^ But the point is that they are 
attacking not the electoral college, but the fall-back provision for 
selection by the House. To use Madison's terms, the electoral 
college is an example of the "federal rule." While that is shy of the 
"Republican principle of numerical equaUty," it is quite different 
from the World Series/12th Amendment model of counting all 
games equally. The World Series analogy usefully reminds us that 
the electoral college is tied to the popular vote in a way that it 
an almost complete response to the objection that one defect of the electoral college is 
that someone could become President by winning only a dozen or so of the biggest states. 
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 233 (Michael Nelson ed., 
1989) (pointing out that winning twelve states could bring a candidate overall victory); 125 
CONG. REC. 5182 (Mar. 15,1979) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) ("[A] candidate can win 
the Presidency by carrying the electoral votes of only 11 states. Yet, surely, no one would 
want to see a President who felt particularly obligated to represent the attitudes of only 
those States or even appear to so represent."). Like many of the unacceptable outcomes 
the electoral college could produce, such a scenario is altogether theoretical. It is hard to 
imagine a real world candidate who is consistently, but exclusively, popular in the larger 
states. 
Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), reprinted in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 557 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987). 
22 With typical bluntness, Levinson writes: 
Why in the world should the House of Representatives vote by state instead of 
by member? Even if one rejects... [the] denunciations of the Senate's 
malapportionment, it seems inexplicable that anyone would accept, let alone 
glory in, the possibility that a majority of state delegations in the House of 
Representatives, representing far less than a majority of the national population, 
would inflict their choice upon the rest of the country. 
Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST. COMM. 
183,185-86 (1995). See also 138 CONG. REC. S7993 (daily ed. June 11,1992) (remarks of 
Sen. Slade Gorton) (introducing constitutional amendment to provide for a run-off in case 
no candidate has a majority in the electoral college and observing that "I do not 
exaggerate when I say that I tremble for the future of our country and its system of 
government when I imagine the reaction of the American people if Congress, under the 
current 12th amendment, chose someone for President who had not received the most 
votes"); Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 
29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 925, 970 (2001) (labeling the one-state, one-vote rule the 
Amendment's "ultimate stupidity"). 
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need not necessarily be, and in which the World Series is not tied 
to total runs. Though the electoral college looks like an aberrant 
institution, it is not as wacky as it might be. 
III. SALVAGING THE ANALOGY 
Notwithstanding its weighted approach, the electoral colbge 
does of course operate something like the World Senes. While 
electoral votes are tied to population, the electoral vote does not 
duplicate the popular vote. Almost always, the divergence 
increases the gap between the two candidates; m general, a modest 
edee in the popular vote translates into a much more significant 
advantage in the electoral college." But the fact that electoral 
v o t e s  d o  n o t  t r a c k  p o p u l a r  v o t e s  a l s o  c a n  c o n c e i v a b l y  r e s u l t  m m  
electoral college tally closer than the popular votes^'^ or, as m 20UU, 
in the popular vote winner losing the electoral college. 
The divergence of popular and electoral votes has four basic 
causes. First, and most important, voting is by (state-\Nade) 
districts, and forty-eight states have adopted the "umt rule, or 
winner-take-all approach to picking electors. Wmner-take-all 
districting allows one side to win a bunch of districts narrowly, lose 
a smaller number grandly, and end up with an electoral coltege (or 
legislative) majority despite having fewer popular votes. Ca the 
games of the 1960 Worlds Series legislative districts, and call the 
Yankees and Pirates political parties, and one sees how a party or 
a candidate that receives only a third of the total votes can still 
have a majority in the state legislature, or the state's congressional 
delegation, or the electoral college." Were every state to adopt 
23 For example, in 1988 George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis by 53.4 percent to 
45.6 percent in the popular vote and 426 (79 percent) to ill (21 percent in the e ectord 
colle^. More dramatically, in 1912 Woodrow Wilson had 42 percent of Je poputo wte 
but 82 percent of the electoral vote. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE TUE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at 183, 186, app. A (1999). Defenders of the 
electoral college see this "magnifying effect" as one of its strengths, arguing that the^g^r 
margin of victory legitimizes the result in the eyes of the voters. See 
Diamond, The Electoral College and the American Idea of Det^cracy, in AFTER THE 
PEOPLE VOTE: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 44,61-62 (Walter Bems ed., rev. 
TOs is thus far only a theoretical possibility. No candidate who prevailed m both 
1 L-J  In  frvrmpr  than  the  
ed. 1992) 
inis lb UlUb lai uill^ a j- - - -- . . , r 
the popular vote and the electoral college has had a wider margin in the former than the 
25 The possibility of a particular party gaining a majonty of votes but a minority of 
seats within the legislature or within the state's congressional delegation seeim to bother 
people less than the winner of the popular vote not being President It of 
lhat the accumulation of such results can mean that the composition of the Hof ® of 
Representatives as a whole conflicts with national vote totals. And the possibility 
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the proportional approach used in Maine and Nebraska, this effect 
would be diluted but not eliminated since (a) two electors would 
still be selected state-wide in each state and (b) selection would 
still be by districts, just smaller ones, so a state's slate of electors 
would be disproportionate to total votes if electors for one 
candidate win narrowly and lose grandly district by district. 
Second, the electoral votes are not allocated exactly m 
proportion to population. For one thing, every state gets two votes 
(corresponding to its two Senators) regardless of size. In those 
states with only a single representative, especially those with a 
population less than that of the theoretical ideal House district, an 
electoral college vote represents many fewer popular votes than m 
larger states.^*^ At the extremes, Wyoming has 165,101 people per 
electoral vote; California has 616,924.'' In addition, state 
populations are not all perfect multiples of l/435th of the total 
number of U.S. citizens. Therefore the citizens per representative 
ratio (and so citizens per electoral vote) varies from state to state. 
an outcome is built in to the two-per-state structure of the Senate. The electoral college's 
potential for disparity between the outcome and the popular vote totals tto looks hke 
more of an aberration than it is. See Diamond, supra note 23, at 53-55 (askmg, 
rhetorically, "fwlhy is it not a loaded pistol to our democratic heads when control over om 
lawmaking bodies can fall, and has fallen, into the hands of the party that lost m the 
national popular vote?" and stressing the advantages that flow from districted elections). 
26 Interestingly, the two "senatorial" votes have almost never made a difference in the 
outcome of an election. Had each state had the same number of electoral votes that it to 
representatives, the outcome in every election but two would have been the saine. ^e 
first time the senatorial votes mattered was m 1916, when Woodrow Wil^n defeated 
Charles Evan Hughes by a margin of twenty-three electoral votes, 277-254. The etoord 
vote gap represents the senatorial votes from twelve states. Wilson earned exactly twelve 
more states than Hughes did. Tlius, had each state had only the number of electoral votes 
as it had representatives, the gap would have been narrowed by twenty-four votes, and 
Hughes would have won by one vote. 
The second time the senatorial votes mattered was in 2000. George Bushcarned 
thirty states; A1 Gore took twenty-one (including the District of Columbia), ^ats a 
difference of nine, or eighteen senatorial votes. Bush needed almost aU of them, 
prevailing 271-267. (The official tally was 271-266 as one Gore elector abstamed in 
protest; throughout this Article I treat Gore as having won 267 electoral votes.) 
Note also that, because many factors other than the existence of senatonal votes can 
contribute to a variance between the electoral vote and the popular vot^he senatonal 
votes do not necessarily create that variance; they may eliminate it. In 2000, the popui^ 
vote would have aligned with the electoral vote but for the senatonal votes. But in 1916, 
the two were aligned because of the senatorial votes. Wilson took the ppular vote, 
9,131,511 (49.3 percent) to 8,548,935 (46.1 percent). Without the senatonal votes, the 
popular vote winner would have been the electoral college loser. A 
22 The 2000 census shows Wyoming's "apportionment population to be 495,304 and 
Cahfomia's to be 33,930,798. U.S. Dep't of Commerce U.S^ Censi^m^u 
Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, by State: Census 2m (2lWi) 
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Commerce], available at http://www.census.gov/population 
/cen2000/tab01.pdf (last visited July 16, 2001). Wyoming has three electoral votes, 
California fifty-five. . . T. n u o,,. 
28 A stark example of this disparity gave rise to an unsuccessful challenge by the state 
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The third cause of disparity between popular and electoral 
votes is that states vary in their rates of registration, of voting by 
registered voters, and of voting-eligible citizens within their 
population. For the electoral college to reproduce the results of a 
direct popular election, electoral votes would have to be allocated 
not by population but by voters?"" 
Finally, while total population and total voters are of course 
connected, the population figures that form the basis of the 
allocation are out of date the first time they are used, and 
increasingly so in subsequent elections. For example, if electoral 
votes in the 2000 election were allocated according to the 
population figures of the 2000 census, George Bush would have 
an electoral college margin of 278-260.^° ^ , 
These factors are familiar and well-understood. At first blush 
it is odd that there have been so few instances in which the 
electoral college winner was the popular vote loser, given t e 
numerous ways in which the allocation of electoral votes fads to 
correspond with actual votes. The explanation is three-fold. First 
these factors will only matter in very close elections, and most 
elections are not very close. Second, the most important of these 
factors is the unit rule, which generally magnifies rather than 
eliminates the gap between winner and loser. Third, as we have 
seen, these different features can cancel each other out. For 
example, in 1916, Wdson won because of the Senatorial votes; 
without them, the unit rule would have led to a victory for Hughes, 
of Montana to the method of allocating representatives. See Uiiited States Dep^ of 
Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992). Tlie 1990 census gave the total popdation^ 
249 022783; thus an "ideal" congressional district would have been home to 5724^ 
people (i e 249 022,783 ^  435). Montana was given a single House seat for its population 
S m 655- a district that was 231,189 people larger than the ideal. (It unsuccessfi^y 
argued that it should have been given two seats, which would have f 
each 170,638 persons smaller than the ideal but closer to it than the 
given.) In contrast, in Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming, the three tot^ 
^pulations below that of the ideal district, every vote 
national average. Id. at 463. Wyoming's "apportionment population m the 1990 census 
was 455,975, making its citizens' votes almost twice as strong as those of Montanans. 
29 For an illustration, see supra note 12 and accompanymg text. 
30 The Census Bureau's apportionment tables ^how shifts m the follown^ 
1990 to 2000 (2000 victor is indicated parenthetically): ArKona 
(Gore) +1- Colorado (Bush) +1; Connecticut (Gore) -1; Honda (Bush) +2 Geopa 
(Bush) +2; Illinois (Gore) -1; Indiana (Bush) -1; VficWgan (Gore) -1; 
Nevada (Bush) +1; New York (Gore) -2; North Carolina (Bush) +1, Oluo (Bush) -1, 
Oklahoma (Bush) -1; Pennsylvania (Gore) -2; Texas (Bush) +2; Wisconsin (Gore) 4. See 
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 27. While these shifts com^unded the 
electoral college and popular votes, the movement easily could have been m the other 
direction- the point is only that the out of date census figures reduce the accuracy of the 
proportional allocations of electoral votes. (Interestingly, the ei^teen-vom naargin would 
J^es^nd exactly to Bush's edge in Senatorial votes; a purely proportional electoral 
college would have produced a tie under these numbers.) 
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the popular vote loser. Thus, one divergence from pure 
proportionality offset another. Similarly, if in 2000 Gore had won, 
say. New Hampshire, giving him a bare electoral college majority 
to go with his popular majority, then we might have said that the 
inaccuracies caused by obsolete census data balanced out the 
inaccuracies produced by the unit rule, preserving the electoral 
college victory for the popular vote winner. 
In any event, these four factors preclude exact proportionality 
between electoral college and popular votes and so explain 
outcomes like that of 2000, when the popular vote winner loses the 
election. They make the World Series analogy plausible 
notwithstanding its imperfections. 
IV. SPINNING OUT THE ANALOGY 
Accepting that the World Series analogy applies, the question 
then becomes whether it is useful. I think it is, because it helps us 
to ask the right question about the electoral college and it helps us 
to understand its operation and consequences. In baseball, a game 
is a relevant unit. Under the rules, assumptions, and structures of 
baseball, it makes sense to proceed game by game when 
determining the champion. The World Series analogy implicitly 
asserts that in presidential elections a state is a relevant unit. The 
question becomes why games matter in baseball, and whether 
there are equivalent reasons for making states matter in 
presidential elections. 
A. Maybe Games Don't Matter in Baseball 
It could be, of course, that games don't matter in baseball—or, 
more precisely, that the choice to proceed game by game (rather 
than inning by inning, or adding up total runs, or total hits, or total 
bases, or by giving zero points for a strike out, one point for a ball 
hit in the infield, two for a ball to the outfield and three for what 
we now call a "hit") is wholly arbitrary. Baseball, like all games, is 
a self-contained collection of random and meaningless rules. So 
viewed, baseball is a setting in which we are concerned only with 
what John Rawls calls "pure procedural justice."^^ In such a 
system, we do not know, or have abandoned the effort to define, 
the correct outcome; instead, whatever outcome the process 
31 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971). 
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produces is by definition fair. Rawls's example is gambling: the 
outcome of a spin of the roulette wheel cannot be justified other 
than by the fact that it was the result of certain procures, but 
that alone is enough to make the outcome just. This model, 
however, is inappropriate for elections, where the correct 
outcome can be described according to an independent, 
substantive criterion. The exact nature of that criterion is a matter 
of debate; for present purposes it suffices to say that elections 
should "promote democracy," or accurately express popular 
preference. The task is to devise procedures that will accomplish 
that goal, that will reach the correct outcome. In devising electoral 
schemes, we seek what Rawls calls "perfect procedural justwe, 
understanding that the best we can hope for is imperfect 
procedural justice"^^ (as in, to use Rawls's example, the criminal 
trial] By definition, procedures developed in a settmg of pure 
procedural justice can hold no lessons when we seek to achieve 
perfect (or even imperfect) procedural justice, i.e. when there is an 
external standard by which to evaluate the correctness of the 
This argument is a powerful one, and I will return to it in the 
conclusion. However, it does not entirely undercut the value of 
the World Series analogy. Unlike, say, roulette, where the only 
meaningful criterion for identifying a victor is that the victor was 
produced by agreed-upon arbitrary rules, baseball ^ ovides a set of 
procedures to identify the better baseball team. To be sure, the 
goal is not to identify the team that is better m any larger sense 
moral, inteUectual, popular—but just to identify the team that is 
better at baseball. Thus, we risk tautology. Being better at 
baseball" is not an external standard; what could it mean other 
than the ability to win baseball games? Nonetheless, there ^a 
difference between a game of skill and a game of chance, ^e 
rules of baseball are designed to give victory to the team with the 
full range of skills that go into baseball; the fact that those skills 
are arbitrarily selected (why throwing and not kicking?) does not 
mean that the rules themselves are arbitrary. Like law generally, 
they must be coherent and make sense within the limited contex 
in which they apply. They are refined in light of the felt 
necessities of the time" (the strike zone changes, the height of the 
mound is adjusted, aluminum bats are allowed m college but not m 
the majors, etc.) and receive constant scrutiny from an engaged 
A separate but related objection would be that the rules of 
32 Id.  
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games are by their nature not only arbitrary but trivial', because the 
stakes are so low, we can live with all sorts of oddities in the rules 
of sports that would be intolerable in other settings. Soccer 
players cannot use their hands; we would not tolerate that rule 
Lgeons. It is wrongheaded to transplant approaches adopted in 
sSs where it doe?not matter to settings where it matters very 
much indeed. Professor Akhil Amar made this argument when 
pressed on the World Series analogy dunng congressional 
testimony: 
Mr. [Robert C] SCOTT [R. Va.]: I would ask Professor Amar 
whether you were outraged when 
awarded the New York Yankees last year s [i.e. the 1996J 
World Series, when they scored 18 runs in the senes and the 
Atlanta Braves scored 26 runs in the series? 
Mr. [Walter] BERNS: He does not know anything about 
baseball. 
Mr. AMAR; I know a lot about baseball, Walter. Arid one of 
the things I know is that, although it is the great Amencan 
pastime, at the end of the day, wait until iiext year, it does not 
matter very much who wins the World Senes. So the 
arbitrariness of certain rules that define a game is less troubling 
if, in the end, the game is just a game.'^ 
Amar's point is well-taken, but it is not a complete response 
(indeed, it was not his complete response during that testimony as 
I will discuss below). First, if the question is not what matters m 
some ultimate sense, but instead what matters to people, the World 
Series ranks pretty high—higher, for some, than the 
election. Many baseball fans, the politically apathetic ^d 
alienated, and Ralph Nader would all counter Ainar ^gjhat 
what does not matter very much is who becomes President. Mo 
important, a lack of consequences does not necessarily produce an 
iZherenl system. Amarl surely right that arbhrarmess or e^ 
is easy to live with in inconsequential settings. But that does not 
mean that arbitrariness and error characterize mconsequenti^ 
settings. Within the artifiaal and arbitrary system that a game 
creates, the component rules must have some sort of coherence 
and sense. And it is at least possible that that coherence and sense 
can be applied to other settings. 
33 1997 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 78. 
3^ Unless it's Ralph Nader. 
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B. Counting Games Ensures that Victory Is Not a Fluke 
The World Series runs seven games and the season 162 in 
order to control against the chance that a team's victo^ in a single 
game was a fluke. A funny bounce, the ball that goes just over the 
outfield wall or just out of reach of the infielder's glove, the 
superstar pitcher's only wild pitch of the season, and the like can 
produce a result in an individual game that is inconsistent with the 
actual relative strengths of the two teams. While this is indeed a 
justification for a World Series (at least one of those words is 
accurate), it has no bearing on the electoral college. The analogy 
to a one-game World "Series" would be having one state elect the 
President. Not surprisingly, that proposal is not on the table. 
Moreover, the choice between counting total runs and 
counting total games in a series has nothing to do with avoiding 
flukes. It was not at all a fluke that the Yankees scored mores runs 
than the Pirates in 1960. They had Mickey Mantle and Roger 
Maris and Moose Skowron; of course they scored more runs. And 
it is not a fluke if one Presidential candidate receives more total 
votes than the other. So this just returns us to the original 
question—^why would we deny victory to the candidate/team with 
more votes/runs? 
C. Discounting Unusually Large Victories 
One reason to count games is that to sum total runs would 
give too much weight to a team's overwhelming success in a single 
game. Many have invoked the World Series or other sports 
analogies to argue that direct election of the President would 
similarly overvalue a candidate's enormous success in his home 
state or elsewhere where that candidate is unusually popular. 
They make three overlapping points. 
1. Overcounting Narrow Talents or Support 
In baseball, overwhelming victories are misleading. Maybe a 
team is just "on" one day, or it is beating up on the other team's 
only bad pitcher, or, the game having been lost, the losing manager 
takes out his best players to avoid injury. Counting a blowout 
equally with a squeaker avoids overvaluing this isolated and 
misleading triumph. That a team had a particular advantage on a 
given day does not mean it is a better team altogether. Proceeding 
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game by game minimizes the advantage resulting from that 
momentary edge. By the same token, if a candidate is 
overwhelmingly but uniquely popular in a single state, that does 
not mean he is a "better" candidate overall. In 2000, for example, 
George Bush surely could have done better in Texas than he did. 
Because the state was comfortably his, he did not need to 
campaign extensively there. Had he paid more attention to his 
home state because what counted was total votes, we might be 
unimpressed that he won a national election on the strength of 
intense local popularity. This point turns the usual complaint 
about the non-national character of the electoral college on its 
head, suggesting that the electoral college ensures broad national 
appeal by discounting intense local popularity. 
One author makes the point this way: 
In sports, we accept that a true champion should be more 
consistent than the 1960 Yankees. A champion should be able 
to win at least some of the tough, close contests by every means 
available—^bunting, stealing, brilliant pitching, dazzling plays in 
the field—and not just smack home runs against second-best 
pitchers. A presidential candidate worthy of office, by the same 
logic, should have broad appeal across the whole nation, and 
not just play strongly on a single issue to isolated blocs of 
voters." 
For supporters of the electoral college, this is the moral of 
Benjamin Harrison's victory over Grover Cleveland in 1888, the 
last time, before 2000, that the winner of the popular vote lost the 
presidency. The standard account is that Cleveland ran a one-
issue campaign, supporting a reduction in tariffs that was 
extremely popular in the South but nowhere else. Cleveland beat 
Harrison so emphatically in the South that he prevailed in the 
popular vote, but Harrison, with broader appeal, won everywhere 
else, handily taking the electoral college 233-168.^ For supporters 
of the electoral college, 1888 shows the strength of the system, not 
Will Hively, Math Against Tyranny, DISCOVER, Nov. 1996, at 80 (discussing the 
work of MIT physicist Alan Natapoff). 
^ See, e.g., JUDITH A. BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE? DEBATING THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE 25-26 (19%). Harrison received 5,445,269 votes (47.8 percent) to 
Qeveland's 5,540,365 (48.6 percent); two other candidates totaled 404,205 popidar, and no 
electoral, votes. LXINGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 23, at 182. The standard accoimt is in 
fact somewhat misleading; Cleveland's support was not quite so narrow and deep as all 
that. Cleveland took the entire South, plus New Jersey and Connecticut; Harrison took 
the remaining northern states and such western states as existed at the time (Cahfomia, 
Oregon, Colorado). Cleveland took eighteen states, Harrison nineteen. Thus, support 
was quite evenly divided geographically. What really hurt Qeveland in the electoral 
college was not that he won only a few states—he did not—but that he lost all five of the 
biggest states (including the biggest, his home state of New York). 
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its weakness. Of course, the real impact of the system is seen not 
in the isolated instance viewed ex post, but in the constant ex ante 
incentives it creates for the parties in selecting candidates, for the 
candidates in campaigning, and for the President in governing. 
The system selects for those with broad geographic appeal, just as 
the World Series tends to select for team with a range of skills and 
strength through the lineup. 
Indeed, there is a direct "geographic" aspect to the World 
Series. Teams are sometimes built to take advantage of 
peculiarities of the home ballpark. Also, most teams enjoy a home 
field advantage unrelated to talent. The World Series is set up to 
minimize these advantages; the team with three games (assuming a 
seven-game series) at home must win at least one game in its 
opponent's park; the team with four games at home might 
conceivably only prevail at home, but it is impossible, given the 
need for an odd number of total games, to avoid that. As a result, 
the winning team must have some success away from its home 
field. Spectacular success at home—^which might reflect only a 
narrow set of talents or factors other than talent (fan support, 
being able to sleep in one's own bed, psychological comfort, 
etc.)—does not amount to more than it should. Obviously, there's 
no precise equation for determining how much success at home 
"should" count, but the win-games approach is a rough proxy for 
that idea. 
2. Not Running Up the Score 
The second reason to minimize the potential gain from a 
single contest that might be applicable to both the World Series 
and the electoral college concerns the incentives that the total 
games approach creates. Candidates focus on the states that are in 
play; they do not waste time and resources in states where victory 
is safe or impossible. Using football rather than baseball (but the 
point is the same), Judith Best explains: 
[F]ootball coaches don't try to run up the score in a game they 
have good reason to believe they have already won . . . [and] 
they don't leave in their starting quarterback and great fullback 
when they are ahead late in the fourth quarter by at least three 
touchdowns. These essential players might get hurt for nothing, 
and thus running up the score in this game may cost them 
victory in other games. It is more important to win other games 
than to boast of beating this team by five touchdowns. Coaches 
know the rules for getting into the Super Bowl; they know that 
trying to run up the score in this game could result in hurting 
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their chances to win in other games. Candidates and political 
parties know the same kind of thing in presidential elections, 
they do know the rules of the electoral vote system; they will try 
to win the most states rather than a few states by overwhelming 
margins.'^ 
As discussed above, because no one is trying to maximize the 
popular vote, tabulations of the popular votes are far from a 
conclusive indicator of whom a majority of American ^o^ers 
prefers. But here the point is normative: the system should 
prevent candidates from capitalizing on local advantages. Breadth 
of support, or talent, is as important as depth. Knowing nothing 
was to be gained in Texas, George Bush directed his attention 
elsewhere and became President only because he was able to find 
sufficient support when he did so. 
3. Every Game Is Different 
A third justification for proceeding game by game in baseball 
is that every game is different. The critical importance of the 
pitcher has a lot to do with this. But, in addition, each game has its 
own particular shape and developments. Teams cannot store up 
hits or runs because hits and runs do not have the same meaning 
the next day. ... r , x ^ ^ 
This notion of course resonates with defenses of the electoral 
college that look to the principle of federalism. On this account, 
the strength of the electoral college is that it 
forces presidential candidates to build broad cross-national 
political coalitions. Thereby it produces presidents who can 
govern because of their broad cross-national support. In 
politics as well as in physics there is such a thing as a critical 
mass. In presidential elections numbers of votes are necessary 
but not sufficient. To create the critical mass necessary for a 
president to govern, his votes must be properly distributed. 
This means he must win states and win states in more than one 
region of the country. 
If we abandon the federal principle in presidential elections we 
will be abandoning a national consensus building device by 
allowing candidates to promise everything to the populous 
Eastern megalopolis, or to promise everything to wlute 
Christians, or to suburbanites who are now half of all voters. 
BEST, supra note 36, at 25. J U A D 
38 2997 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 25 (prepared statement of Judith A. Best); see 
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Supporters of federalism tend to be supporters of the electoral 
college; federalism skeptics tend to be electoral college skeptics. 
In an editorial following the 2000 election, The New York Times 
invoked federalism in arguing for retention of the electoral college 
thus: 
The Electoral College ... was and is one of those safeguards of 
a balanced federalism—^much like the allocation of two senators 
to each state, regardless of size. And by offering the promise 
that even the smallest states could tip the balance in close 
elections, the system made it impossible to ignore them. This, 
in tum, required presidential candidates to build alliances 
across ideological and geographical lines. 
It is true, as the system's critics suggest, that the rise of mass 
communications and modem transportation has knit the 
country together in ways unforeseen by the founders. But that 
does not mean that we are one homogeneous, undifferentiated 
mass, at least not yet. There are still definably Midwestern 
interests, or Northwestem interests, as opposed to, say. Eastern 
interests. There are still definably rural interests, just as there 
are urban interests.^' 
The World Series analogy perhaps helps in evaluating this 
argument. Again, in the World Series it is understood that a game 
is a relevant unit. The question is whether a state is a relevant unit 
when we elect the President. Two steps should be distinguished: 
(1) dividing the nation into districts, and then (2) drawing the 
district boundaries along state lines. The Times's argument 
supports the first step but undercuts the second. Districting can 
require that a candidate appeal to more than just a single, majority 
eonstituency (unless that large constituency is spread evenly 
through all districts). But the Times says nothing about why 
district lines should be drawn along state boundaries. Indeed, its 
own rationale suggests they should not. If different interests are 
what matter, then the districts ought to encompass discrete 
interests; the boundaries might be regional (Midwestern versus 
Eastern), or rural versus urban, or not geographical at all. If, or 
also 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 34 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) 
(stating that direct election of the president would be "completely incompatible with 
federalism"); id. at 358 (statement of Theodore White) (stating, in arguing against direct 
election of the President, that "[njothing any of you can ever do could be more disastrous 
than undermining the Federal System of the United States, the association of proud 
communities and states who make ours the wonderful, difficult, and mysterious country it 
is"); id. at 361 (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson) (arguing that the "federal system," in 
which voters participate in national elections only through their states, is "highly 
beneficial," and that ''state voting power is more important" than "the voting power of 
individuals"). See generally Diamond, supra note 23, at 51-56. 
Editorial, The Case for the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,2000, at A34. 
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when, Internet voting becomes secure and reliable, districts could 
be drawn along the lines of profession, or wealth, or any sel^ 
selected criterion; people could set up their own districts, which 
others would be allowed to join until they are full. Such ideas no 
doubt would have many shortcomings. But the basic point is that 
state boundaries are very, and increasingly, artificial. Much more 
than in 1787, and increasingly as time goes on, they do not define 
communities of interest. As the Times implies, a New York yuppie 
and a Chicago yuppie, or a rural New York farmer and an Illmois 
farmer, have more in common than do the two New Yorkers or 
the two Illinoisans. . . 
This view is of course contested. That is a discussion tor 
another day, with consequences far beyond the electoral college. 
And, as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine ignoring state lines 
in drawing districts for presidential elections. For histoncal 
reasons, if nothing else, districts will continue to reflect state 
boundaries. It may therefore be enough to argue for a distncted 
system, with the understanding that such a system would perforce 
follow state lines. For present purpose, the only point is that the 
World Series analogy, and much writing about the electoral 
college, argues for districting but is silent as to whether the district 
boundaries should be state boundaries. 
D. Increasing the Impact of Individual Performance 
The World Series analogy has one more aspect. Proceeding 
game by game increases the chances that any particular player will 
make a critical contribution to the outcome. Bill Mazeroski stands 
out as the hero of the 1960 World Series because he contributed 
the most important hit; but it was important only because he came 
up at the right time—^a moment when a single hit could determine 
the outcome of the entire contest, which had come down to a 
single game. The win-games approach has allowed many players 
to make absolutely critical contributions—^not always ones that the 
players or the fans cherish the way they do Mazeroski's home run. 
The inglorious individual contributions of Fred Merkle, Micky 
Owen,^^ and Bill Buckner^^ were made possible by the same 
isolation and heightened impact of the individual action that made 
"•O The 26th greatest moment, according to The Sporting News. See SPORTING NEWS, 
The 10 Next Greatest Moments, at http;//tsn.sportingnews.conVbaseball/25moments/ 
nextl0.html (last visited July 3,2001). ^ 
Number 23 on The Sporting News's list. SMITH, supra note 3, at loo. 
« Number 8 (ridiculously) for The Sporting News. Id. at 60. 
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Mazeroski's home run what it was. Such circumstances arise only 
because to win the World Series a team must win four separate 
games, not just score the most amount of runs. A single run, 
scored at the right time in the right game, can change the whole 
outcome. So can a single mistake, made at just the wrong time in 
just the wrong game. (That is the nuance of Yogi Berra's wiser-
than-it-seems remark about making the "wrong mistakes.")"^ The 
odds that a single run or a single mistake will have such an impact 
are far smaller if we just add up total runs; under that approach 
Mazeroski's home run is irrelevant. 
The same dynamic operates with regard to districted 
elections. By subdividing the electorate and adding votes within 
these subdivisions, the odds that a single vote, or group of votes, 
will change the outcome greatly increase. For a single vote, or 
voting bloc, to affect the outcome, the election must be closely 
contested. The smaller the district, the more likely it will be close. 
This may not be a good thing. Critics of the electoral college 
decry how minute changes in votes cast could have changed many 
election outcomes (and produced a divergence between the 
popular and electoral vote winners) So, for example, if 1,983 
voters in California had voted for Hughes rather than Wilson in 
1916, Hughes would have won the election; a change of 11,424 
votes, across five states, would have given Richard Nixon the 
White House in 1960; and a shift of 9,246 votes in Hawaii and Ohio 
would have sufficed for Gerald Ford to defeat Jimmy Carter in 
1976."' These possibilities are in the nature of a districted, state-
by-state system, just as they are in the nature of a win-games 
system for the World Series. 
For electoral college critics, it seems self-evident that having 
election results hinge on such narrow differences is problematic. 
(In general, these arguments begin with the premise that it is 
unacceptable for the popular vote winner not to become President; 
The more obvious and direct legal application of Berra's explanation for the 
Yankees' 1960 loss is to the rule of harmless error. See William D. Arziiza et al., The 
Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697,762-63 (1997). 
See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 159 (comments of Sen. Paul Simon) 
(describing minor vote shifts that could have changed the outcome and given the White 
House to the popular vote loser and observing that "[tjhat strikes me as not being 
healthy"); id. at 178-79 (prepared testimony of Amy Isaacs, National Director, Americans 
for Democratic Action) (characterizing the possibility of a popular vote loser becoming 
President as "the most compelling argument for abolishing the electoral college," noting 
"close calls" in numerous elections, and arguing that we should stop "playing 'Russian 
Roulette' in the selection of our President"). 
A full description of elections in which minor changes in the votes of specific states 
would have sent the election to the House or resulted in a different winner can be found in 
LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 23, at 36-37, tbl. 5 (identifying 22 "hairbreadth 
elections"). For criticism of such analyses, see BEST, supra note 36, at 26-28. 
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since that has rarely happened, the argument is bolstered by 
pointing to the instances in which it almost happened.) But the 
World Series analogy draws attention to the fact that the sahent 
fact may be not that the popular vote winner can lose the election, 
but that the election's outcome can be determined by such small 
numbers of voters. The electoral college system increases the 
likelihood that a single individual, or a single group, will cast the 
deciding vote or votes. It increases the circumstances in which, 
like the Mazeroski home run, an individual can have a 
disproportionate impact. 
The 2000 election was a case in point. Never in recent 
memory, perhaps never at all, has the American electorate had a 
stronger sense that every vote mattered. It all seemed to come 
down to Florida, and there the election was excruciatingly close. 
And it only came down to Florida because of almost as close tallies 
in a number of other states, in any one of which a sh^t shift could 
also have changed the overall outcome. But the national election 
was not excruciatingly close, nor is it likely ever to be simply 
because the electorate is so large. 
Some defenders of the electoral college see this characteristic 
as its greatest strength. Alan Natapoff, an MIT physics professor 
with a sidehne in the electoral college, and a particular fan of the 
World Series analogy, endorses the current system because it 
enhances the potential for individual impact."^ His argument that 
the electoral college maximizes individual impact is convincing but 
incomplete in two ways. First, Natapoff never explains why the 
goal of an election system should be to maximize individual 
impact. One possible justification would be that it increases 
turnout, though Natapoff does not say that. He does imply that it 
increases the excitement of the election, the way it increases the 
excitement of the World Series, but that seems a pecuhar, or at 
least marginal, goal for an electoral mechanism. Second, while the 
odds of an individual casting a decisive vote are higher with the 
electoral college system than they would be in a national direct 
election, they remain vanishingly small. Ten times zero is still 
zero. No individual will ever cast the single, deciding vote for 
President. 
A variant of the same point, however, is a longstanding and 
important justification for the current system. The electoral 
college is generally understood to increase the political power of 
certain discrete pohtical minorities—^farmers, or African-
See, e.g., Alan Natapoff, A Mathematical One-Man One-Vote Rationale for 
Madisonian Presidential Voting Based on Maximum Individual Voting Power, 88 PUB. 
CHOICE 259,272 (1996). 
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Americans, or the elderly—^because they might form the swing 
voters in a critical state. A generation ago, Alexander Bickel 
defended the electoral college precisely because it gave racial and 
ethnic minorities enhanced strength as the swing votes in large 
states."" Bickel's basic argument against abolition of the electoral 
college was that, while one could not predict the consequences 
"with absolute assurance,... the probabihties are that popular 
election of the president would work a diminution of the political 
power of racial and other minority groups in the nation's urban 
centers.'"^ This tendency to promote the political strength of 
ethnic voting blocs has been a central argument for retaining the 
electoral college,"' although some have seen it as a shortcoming 
rather than a virtue.'" 
Without entering into that debate, it does seem fair to say that 
the electoral college will make particular voting blocs critical to 
the outcome, but it will do so in unpredictable ways. While it is 
often suggested that the electoral college enhances African-
American voting power, Longley and Peirce suggest that, in fact, 
African-Americans are consistently disadvantaged by the electoral 
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 13. 
*'*' Id. As Bickel saw it, 
The question about the electoral college, then, should not be whether it is 
inevitably and purely majoritarian. It is not, although it is very considerably 
more so than our other national institutions. The question should be whether or 
not the electoral college tends to enhance minorities rule; whether it tends to 
include or exclude various groups from influence in the institution of the 
presidency, and whether if it assigns somewhat disproportionate influence to 
some groups, they are the ones which are relatively shortchanged in Congress, so 
that the total effect is the achievement of a balance of influence? Practical men 
should disenfranchise themselves from the romance of pure majoritarianism. 
Id. at 17. See also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 
YALE L.J. 1567, 1595-96 (1985) (tying Bickel's approval of the electoral college to his 
general doubts about "uncompromising majoritarianism" because of its destabilizing 
effects). 
See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 129 (prepared testimony of Curtis 
B. Gans, Comm. for the Study of the Am. Electorate) (objecting that "[djirect elections 
would permit those who conduct a campaign to effectively ignore the needs and desires of 
significant minorities in our society," including African-Americans, who "constitute an 
ignorable 12 percent of the national voting age population" but "a potentially 
determinative minority" in certain states); 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 163, 
164-68 (testimony of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Black Leadership Forum) (arguing that direct 
election of the President would significantly harm the black electorate). 
^ For example, some years ago Representative Ed Gossett (D. Tex.) asked, 
rhetorically. 
Is it fair, is it honest, is it democratic... to place such a premium on a few 
thousand labor votes, or Italian votes, or Irish votes, or Negro votes, or Jewish 
votes, or Polish votes, or Communist votes, or big-city machine votes, simply 
because they happen to be located in two or three large, industrial pivoti 
states? 
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 20. 
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college system (as are rural voters), while Hispanic, foreign-bom, 
Jewish, and urban voters are advantaged.'' This is a matter of 
continuing dispute. In the 2000 election, one might reasonably say 
that the voting group that ultimately decided the election was the 
very conservative Cuban-American population of south Florida. 
In 1996, 37 percent of Cuban-Americans in Florida voted for the 
Clinton/Gore ticket; in 2000 only 20 percent voted for the 
Gore/Lieberman ticket.'" That difference was enough to give Bush 
Florida and the White House. On this account, Clinton cost Gore 
the election, but the source of the problem was not Monica 
Lewinsky but Elian Gonzalez." 
The possibility of a political minority affecting the outcome of 
the election, and the difficulty of predicting how or where, in fact 
tie in well with the World Series. In 2000, Cuban-Americans 
played the role of Bill Mazeroski. But one could not have 
predicted either in advance. Therefore, it would have been a 
mistake for the Yankees to build a defense designed precisely to 
guard against a Mazeroski home mn, and it would have been a 
mistake for the candidates to pitch their campaign exclusively to 
Cuban-Americans. Not only might it have been a mistake because 
they might not have been as critical as it tumed out they were, but 
focusing on just Mazeroski or Cuban-Americans would have 
meant ignoring other players and voters, who might then have 
behaved differently than they did in the actual event. 
The disproportionate impact of a single brilliant or calamitous 
play has one other application to the electoral college. A standard 
defense of the electoral college is that it makes it much easier to 
51 LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 23, at 154-61. Longley and Peirce's methodology is 
not straightforward. They do not focus on whether a particular group might provide the 
swing votes in a swing state. Rather, they calculate which states have the most voting 
power (by their methodology, the six most populous states have greater than average 
voting power, all other states have less than average voting power), then look to see where 
members of different groups live. Because blacks are less concentrated in the six most 
populous states than in the nation as a whole, they are "disadvantaged" by the system. 
This approach is problematic. For example, if blacks were a critical voting blw in any of 
the six most populous states, and assuming some commonality of "black concerns 
nationwide that would make, say, blacks in California a proxy for blacks generally, it 
would not matter that a disproportionately high number of blacks live in the forty-five less 
populous states. 
52 Dahleen Glanton, Hispanics Turn Florida into More of a Swing State, Cm. TRIB., 
Nov. 26,2000, at 17. . 
53 This is the view of Joe Garcia, Executive Director of the Cuban Amencan National 
Foundation. See Alex Veiga, A Year Later, Elian's Echoes Linger, WASH. POST, NOV. 26, 
2000, at A2. Of course, the loss of Cuban-American support was no more or less deciswe 
than dozens of other phenomena of equal size. No vote or bloc of votes within a winning 
total is more or less "decisive" than any other. The baseball analogy here is not the World 
Series but the sport's short-lived and appropriately abandoned use of the "game-winning 
run batted in" statistic. 
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handle allegations of fraud, other voting improprieties, or simple 
mistakes. In a close nation-wide direct election, the losing side 
would insist on a nationwide recount, claims of fraud around the 
country would have to be investigated, and the outcome of the 
election thrown in doubt for weeks. By proceeding state by state, 
such inquiries are localized and made much more manageable.'" 
The baseball equivalent is the spitter that goes unnoticed or 
the blown call." But proceeding game by game does not 
necessarily isolate and reduce the impact of the blown call. To the 
contrary, like Mazeroski's home run or Buckner's error, the 
impact of the blown call can be magnified by the fact that we do 
not sum total runs to determine a winner. Red Sox fans continue 
to be sure that their team lost the 1975 World Series because the 
umpires failed to call interference when Ed Armbrister stood in 
Carlton Fisk's way as the latter tried to get to Armbrister's bunt in 
the 10th inning of the tied third game. Many Democrats have 
similar feelings about Florida. Thus, the standard argument about 
the advantages of a districted election with regard to contested 
outcomes is valid, but incomplete. There is an offsetting 
downside—^mistaken or illegal voting in a single state can 
determine the entire outcome in a way that would be impossible in 
a general, direct election. 
CONCLUSION—^A CAUTIONARY NOTE 
The analogy between the World Series and the electoral 
college works in many ways. It at least helps us understand the 
workings of the electoral college—its relative closeness to a purely 
majoritarian system, the incentives it creates for candidates, and 
the way in which it discounts intense local enthusiasm, requires a 
breadth of support, and increases the voting power of individuals 
and, more importantly, blocs. It also highlights the central 
question of whether states are a relevant unit in picking a 
president. (Though it cannot be denied that many have managed 
to stumble upon that question unguided by the light cast by this 
metaphor.) 
The analogy is also helpful because the comparison makes 
See 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 14 (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell); 
George F. Will, "Had 'Em All the Way", NEWSWEEK, NOV. 27,2000, at 92. 
'5 Other sports provide better analogies to vote fraud—the basketball foul that goes 
unseen, or the illegail block in football, or use of banned substances in track and field. One 
of baseball's many advantages over other sports is that it provides so few opportunities to 
cheat. 
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clear that the key characteristics of the electoral college, and the 
area of overlap with the World Series, arise from the fact that it is 
a system based on districts, not that it is a system based on states. 
Just about every aspect of the connection has nothing to do with 
the fact that the districts also happen to be states. Indeed, states 
may be pretty poor proxies for the units of commonahty 
federalism arguments invoke.'® That insight prompts a heretical 
thought; perhaps we should have districted presidential elections 
while ignoring state boundaries. The suggestion is a political non-
starter, but perhaps one benefit of working through analogies is 
that doing so prompts heretical thinking. 
At bottom, however, the World Series analogy begs the 
question whether it makes sense to set up the World Series and the 
presidential election along similar principles. One should be wary 
about drawing normative conclusions from the comparison. There 
is no necessary reason why the World Series and the election of 
the President ought to correspond, and several reasons why they 
might not. 
First, a particular mechanism or aspect of the system might be 
found in both settings, but we may value it for different reasons, or 
even wish to maximize it in the one setting and minimize it in the 
other. Consider the fact that counting states (or games) mpimizes 
individual voting power in the one instance and the possibihty of 
an individual player's decisive action in the other. The analogy 
helps us to see that that is so but it does not tell us why that is a 
good thing. Professor Natapoff, for example, takes it as a given 
that the best voting system maximizes individual voting power. 
But he does not explain why. Perhaps it is because it creates the 
strongest incentive to vote, perhaps it just keeps things interesting, 
perhaps it creates an incentive for candidates to be broadly 
appealing because they cannot predict who will cast a decisive 
vote. Similarly, we might seek to maximize the individual player's 
influence for corresponding reasons (to create an incentive to play 
hard and be ready, increase suspense, stimulate overall quality), or 
perhaps for other ones. The reasons need not be the same. 
Certainly in games we often accept or even embrace an element of 
pure chance or luck with which we are less comfortable in 
elections* 
Second, there may be important concerns present in the one 
setting but absent in the other. Most importantly, as Professor 
Amar put it, one might reject the World Series analogy "[bjecause 
all runs are not created equal. But the deep principle in the ethos 
^ See supra text following note 39. 
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i s  . . .  t h a t  a l l  m e n  a n d  w o m e n  a r e  c r e a t e d  e q u a l . " "  A  s y s t e m  i n  
which many runs turn out to be irrelevant or less weighty than 
others violates no independent constraint; a system in which many 
votes turn out to be irrelevant or less weighty than others arguably 
does violate an independent constraint. So for some the complete 
argument against the electoral college is that it is inconsistent with 
this principle.'® That objection to the electoral college system may 
ultimately not carry the day, but it is no answer to point to the 
World Series as a response. 
Third, one should be wary about treating baseball, or any 
other human construction, as possessed of some intrinsic truth. 
The point is much like the standard objections to the nineteenth-
century, Langdellian notion of law as science. Langdell's essential 
error was to treat a human creation as having an extra-human, 
Platonic existence." Similarly, there is a real risk of getting carried 
away with finding normative lessons in sports. For example. 
Professor Natapoff has a sophisticated and mathematically 
complex defense of the electoral college, but discovers too great a 
normative lesson in baseball: 
Major sporting championships can and do turn on individual 
errors or flashes of brilliance at a critical moment of a critical 
game. These dramatic crises are regarded as memorable 
treasures, and (implicitly) as validation of the sport's rules and 
tradition. By analogy, a few key votes in a close state can turn a 
whole presidential outcome. That lesson to candidates is the 
moral of this sport.® 
Sports do not hold "morals" for constitutional structures. Nor 
should we design constitutional structures to maximize 
competition, excitement, or the memorableness of outcomes. Nor 
does a particular arrangement make sense for presidential 
elections because it makes sense for baseball. 
In short, the analogy is illuminating and fun. At the end of 
^ 1997 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 79 (testimony of Akhil Amar). 
^ Writing in support of Senator Bayh's proposal for direct election of the president, 
the staff counsel of the ACLU put it succinctly: 
The ACLU believes that the electoral college should be abolished and the 
President of the United States should be chosen by direct popular election. Our 
position is based on the principle that each individual is entitled to have his or 
her vote equally weighed in the nation's most important election. 
Letter from David E. I^dau, ACLU staff counsel, to Sen. Birch Bayh (Apr. 16, 1979), 
reprinted in 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 366. 
See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987,100 HARV. L. REV. 761,762 (1987). 
See Natapoff, supra note 46, at 272; see also Hively, supra note 35, at 85 (quoting 
Natapoff as saying, with regard to the 1960 World Series: "Everybody regarded it as one 
of the most glorious World Series ever. To do it any other way would totally destroy the 
degree of competition and excitement that's essential to all sports."). 
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the day, though, the electoral college and the World Series each 
must be evaluated on its independent merits. 
